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Abstract
We introduce a Bayesian framework for modeling individual diﬀerences, in which subjects are
assumed to belong to one of a potentially inﬁnite number of groups. In this model, the groups
observed in any particular data set are not viewed as a ﬁxed set that fully explains the variation
between individuals, but rather as representatives of a latent, arbitrarily rich structure. As more
people are seen, and more details about the individual diﬀerences are revealed, the number of
inferred groups is allowed to grow. We use the Dirichlet process—a distribution widely used in
nonparametric Bayesian statistics—to deﬁne a prior for the model, allowing us to learn ﬂexible
parameter distributions without overﬁtting the data, or requiring the complex computations
typically required for determining the dimensionality of a model. As an initial demonstration of
the approach, we present three applications that analyze the individual diﬀerences in category
learning, choice of publication outlets, and web browsing behavior.
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“I am surprised that the author has used this data set. In my lab, when we collect
data with such large individual diﬀerences, we refer to the data as “junk”. We then
re-design our stimuli and/or experimental procedures, and run a new experiment. The
junk data never appear in publications”
– An anonymous reviewer in 2005, commenting on research
that sought to model individual diﬀerences in cognition.
1 Introduction
Suppose we asked one hundred people which number was the most unlucky. Of those
people, ﬁfty said ‘13’, forty said ‘4’, and ten said ‘87’. This variation is unlikely to be
due to noise in the cognitive process by which people make unluckiness judgments: If we
replicated the experiment with the same people, the same ﬁfty people would probably say
13 again. It seems much more likely that most of the observed variation arises from genuine
diﬀerences in what those people believe. A complete explanation of people’s answers would
have to account for this variation.
Often, cognitive modeling ignores individual variation, because it uses data that have been
averaged or aggregated across subjects. The potential beneﬁt of averaging data is that,
if the performance of subjects really is the same except for noise, the averaging process
will tend to remove the eﬀects of the noise, and the resultant data will more accurately
reﬂect the underlying psychological phenomenon. When the performance of subjects has
genuine diﬀerences, however, it is well known (e.g., Ashby, Maddox, & Lee, 1994; Estes,
1956; Myung, Kim, & Pitt, 2000) that averaging produces data that do not accurately
represent the behavior of individuals, and provide a misleading basis for modeling. In our
unlucky numbers experiment, the average unlucky number is approximately 17, which was
not given as an answer by any participant. More fundamentally, the practice of averaging
data restricts the focus of cognitive modeling to issues of how people are the same. While
modeling invariants is fundamental, it is also important to ask how people are diﬀerent.
If experimental data reveal individual diﬀerences in cognitive processes, we should seek
to model this variation rather than ignore it. From the unlucky number data, we might
discover that, while ﬁfty people were drawing on an Anglo-Saxon tradition in which 13
is considered unlucky, forty were drawing on a corresponding Chinese tradition in which
4 is considered unlucky. Moreover, the remaining ten participants might turn out to be
Australian cricket fans (87 is considered an unlucky number for Australian batsmen).
Cognitive modeling that attempts to accommodate individual diﬀerences usually assumes
that each subject behaves in accordance with a unique parameterization of a model,
and so evaluation is undertaken against the data from each subject independently (e.g.,
Ashby, Maddox & Lee, 1994; Nosofsky, 1986; Wixted & Ebbesen, 1997). Although this
avoids the problem of corrupting the underlying pattern of the data, it also foregoes the
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Fig. 1. Standard modeling approaches for data from many subjects, involving the aggregation
of data (panel a), and the modeling of each individual independently (panel b). The data are
plotted in the lower data space, with diﬀerent symbols for each participant. The upper parameter
space shows the parameter distributions inferred under each modeling approach.
potential beneﬁts of averaging, and guarantees that modeling is aﬀected by all of the
noise in the data. In our hypothetical unlucky numbers experiment, it seems unlikely to
be a coincidence that fully half of the participants said exactly the same thing. A more
parsimonious account is that the ﬁfty people who said 13 are in some way related to
one another, but are not related to the forty people who said 4 or the ten people who
said 87. Moreover, suppose we discovered an Australian cricket fan with a bad memory,
and this person accidentally says 86. Individual subject analysis does not allow us to
“share statistical strength” between the cricket fans, in the sense that having seen many
87 answers could be used to correct the ‘noisy’ 86 answer. In general, modeling everybody
independently increases the risk of overﬁtting, and hence reduces the ability to make
accurate predictions or to generalize to new contexts.
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate about the relative merits of ﬁtting aggregated versus
individual data (e.g., Maddox & Estes, 2005), the previous discussion suggests that both
viewpoints are unsatisfying. To provide a visual illustration of this point, consider the
hypothetical data shown in Figure 1. The ﬁgure depicts the outcome of a simple experi-
ment in which we collect noisy data from three participants. The three participants’ data
are indicated with crosses, circles, and triangles. The crosses form a roughly elliptical
shape from the lower left to the upper right of the data space, whereas the circles and
triangles form ellipses that slant from the upper left to the lower right. On the left hand
side (panel a), we aggregate across participants, and estimate a single parameter value
θ that produces a distribution that is roughly circular, indicated by the contour plot.
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Fig. 2. The model-based view of individual diﬀerences. The data are plotted in the lower data
space, with diﬀerent symbols for each participant. The middle parameter space shows the pa-
rameter values inferred for each participant based on their data and an individual diﬀerences
model that describes how these parameters can vary between people. The upper parameter space
shows the inferred parameter values for this individual diﬀerences model.
The aggregate looks nothing like the individuals. On the right hand side (panel b), we
estimate a parameter value independently for each participant. The inferred parameter
values θ1, θ2 and θ3 and their associated contour plots now do capture the basic aspects
of everyone’s performance. However, this accuracy has come at the cost of losing sight of
the similarity between two of the participants. Using the individual ﬁtting approach, this
relationship θ2 ≈ θ3 is not represented. Even if we observed a large number of people with
very similar parameter values, we could make no formal inference about the relationship
between them. Ultimately, neither the aggregate nor the individual view captures the
pattern of similarities and diﬀerences apparent in the data. Aggregated models can learn
similarities and individual models can learn diﬀerences, but modeling individual variation
in cognition requires being able to learn both simultaneously.
Because of these diﬃculties, a number of authors have considered more sophisticated
ways of expressing individual diﬀerences within models of cognitive processes (e.g., Lee
& Webb, in press; Peruggia, Van Zandt & Chen, 2002; Rouder, Sun, Speckman, Lu &
Zhou, 2003; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers & Blum, 2003; Webb & Lee, 2004). The
central innovation is to provide an explicit model for the kinds of individual diﬀerences
that might appear in the data, in much the same way as established methods in psycho-
metric models like Item Response Theory (e.g., Lord, 1980; Hoskens & de Boeck, 2001;
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Junker & Sijtsma, 2001). The general approach, illustrated schematically in Figure 2, is
to supplement the cognitive model that describes variation within a single participant’s
data with an individual diﬀerences model that describes how cognitive parameters can
vary across people. Using suﬃciently ﬂexible individual diﬀerences models, it is possible
to learn both the similarities and diﬀerences between people.
Model-based approaches to individual diﬀerences vary in terms of the class of distributions
that are allowed to describe variation in parameter values, reﬂecting diﬀerent assumptions
about which aspects of individual diﬀerences are the most important to capture. In this pa-
per we introduce a new model-based framework for understanding individual diﬀerences.
Informed by recent insights in statistics and machine learning (e.g., Escobar & West, 1995;
Neal, 2000), our inﬁnite groups model makes it possible to divide subjects who behave
similarly into groups, without assuming an upper bound on the number of groups. This
model is suﬃciently ﬂexible to capture the heterogeneous structure produced by diﬀerent
subjects pursuing diﬀerent strategies, allows the number of groups in the observed sample
to grow naturally as more data appear, and avoids the complex computations that are
often required when one chooses an individual diﬀerences model by standard model selec-
tion methods. We illustrate the inﬁnite groups model by considering simple multinomial
models that predict the frequencies of responses across a set of categories. However, the
idea generalizes to more general classes of probabilistic models.
The structure of the paper is as follows: We begin with an overview of existing frameworks
for modeling individual diﬀerences, and their interpretations as Bayesian hierarchical mod-
els. We then introduce the inﬁnite groups approach as a principled way to address some
of the problems associated with these frameworks, including model selection problems.
Next, we provide a brief tutorial on the Dirichlet process, which forms the basis of our
approach, and discuss how model selection proceeds when working with the inﬁnite groups
framework. We then derive the inﬁnite groups model for discrete data and present illustra-
tive simulation studies. Finally, we present three applications that analyze the individual
diﬀerences in categorization performance, choice of publication outlets, and web browsing
behavior.
2 Hierarchical Bayesian Models for Individual Diﬀerences
Two dominant model-based approaches have emerged in the literature on individual dif-
ferences. In a stochastic parameters model (e.g., Peruggia et al., 2002; Rouder et al., 2003),
every participant is assumed to have a unique parameter value θ that is sampled from
a parametric distribution, as illustrated in Figure 3a. The intuition behind the approach
is that, while every person is unique, the variation between people is not arbitrary, and
can be described by a distribution over the parameters. These distributions are generally
smooth and unimodal, reﬂecting a general tendency at the mode, and a noise model de-
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scribing the variations that exist across individuals’ parameters. In contrast, the idea that
underlies the groups model is that there exist a number of distinct types of qualitatively
diﬀerent performance. Accordingly, this approach assumes that people fall into one of a
number of fundamentally distinct groups. Within a group, people are assumed to behave
in the same way, but the groups themselves can vary in all kinds of ways. Under this
approach to individual diﬀerences modeling (e.g., Lee & Webb, in press; Steyvers et al.,
2003; Webb & Lee, 2004), the goal is to partition subjects into a number of groups and
associate each group with a parameterization θ, as illustrated in Figure 3b.
In order to understand the assumptions that underlie these two frameworks, it is help-
ful to view them as hierarchical Bayesian models (e.g., Lindley & Smith, 1972). Sup-
pose we have data from an experiment that involves n participants. If the ith individual
participant provides mi observations, we can denote these observations by the vector
xi = (xi1, . . . , ximi). By specifying a cognitive model, we assume that these data can be
described as i.i.d. samples from the distribution xij ∼ F (· | θi). Additionally, by specifying
an individual diﬀerences model, we assume that there is a distribution θi ∼ G(· |φ) that
we can use to describe the parameter values θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) for each of the participants.
Since we now have two distinct levels at which we wish to construct models, we can write
a model of this form as the two-level hierarchical model,
xij | θi ∼ F (· | θi)
θi |φ ∼ G(· |φ).
(1)
In this expression φ denotes the parameters used to describe the individual diﬀerences
model G(· |φ). Letting x = (x1, . . . ,xn) refer to the complete data set, we can write the









F (xij | θi)

G(θi |φ) dθi. (2)
To apply Bayesian inference to this model, we also need to deﬁne a prior on φ. We will
assume that φ ∼ π(·) for some appropriate distribution π(·). Statistical inference in this
model is achieved by ﬁnding p(θ,φ |x), the joint posterior distribution over parameter
values and individual diﬀerence models. However, we are often only interested in some
aspects of this joint posterior, so only some parts are reported. Two cases of particular
interest are,
(1) Posterior over parameters for the cognitive model. One role of G(· |φ) is to induce
dependencies between the parameters θi. In some contexts this is all that the re-
searcher requires, so it is natural in these situations to consider the marginal distri-
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bution p(θ |x). The idea in this case is that we would use the dependencies induced
via our individual diﬀerences model to produce better parameter estimates.
(2) Posterior over the parameters for the individual diﬀerences model. A second role for
G(· |φ) is to provide a theoretical account of the variation across the parameters
θi. In those contexts, the researcher may wish to report the marginal distribution
p(φ |x). The idea in this case is to learn the structure of individual variation from
the data.
In this paper we are interested more in the second case than the ﬁrst, and it is necessary
to distinguish between the two. This is particularly important since stochastic parameter
models are generally motivated by the ﬁrst case, while group models are often applied
in the second. This diﬀerence in focus is reﬂected in the fact that, while both stochastic
parameter models and group models can be viewed as hierarchical models, they diﬀer in
the form of the distribution G(· |φ) that describes individual variation. In the stochastic
parameters model, G(· |φ) is usually a tractable distribution such as a Gaussian, with
φ corresponding to the parameters of that distribution, as in Figure 3a. In contrast, if
we have a model with k groups, the individual diﬀerences model G(· |φ) is a weighted
collection of k point masses, as depicted in Figure 3b. That is,
G(· |w, θ) =
k∑
z=1
wz δ(· | θz), (3)
where δ(· | θz) denotes a point mass distribution located at θz and where ∑kz=1 wz = 1. In
the groups model, φ = (w, θ). It is important to notice that in this expression, θ refers
to the locations of the k spikes that make up the distribution G(· |w, θ) and are thus
parameters of the individual diﬀerences model. The parameter values for the individual
subjects are then sampled from this distribution, and are all equal to one of these k values.
Notationally, we will distinguish between these two uses through the subscripts: θi will
denote the parameters for the ith participant, while θz will denote parameter for group
z. If the subscript is ambiguous, we will make it clear in each context.
The hierarchical Bayesian model perspective reveals some of the strengths and weaknesses
of the two approaches. Assuming that individual parameters θi follow a simple parametric
distribution, as in the stochastic parameters model, simpliﬁes the problem of learning
an individual diﬀerences model from data, but places strong constraints on the kind of
variation that can manifest across subjects. A particularly severe problem arises when
we specify a unimodal distribution to capture individual diﬀerences that are inherently
multimodal, perhaps arising from diﬀerent interpretations of a task. In this case the model
cannot capture the most important aspect of the variation between people. Unimodal
distributions naturally suggest an interpretation in terms of variation away from a single
prototypical parameter value at the mode, which is misleading in many situations. To
return to the unlucky numbers experiment, we might end up estimating a distribution











Fig. 3. Parameter distributions associated with stochastic parameters approach to individual
diﬀerences (panel a), the original groups approach (panel b), and the inﬁnite groups approach
(panel c). The continuous measure shown in panel a is a probability density function (pdf) while
the discrete measures in panels b and c are probability mass functions (pmf).
individual subjects. While this account may provide reasonable estimates of the individual
parameters (case 1), it is unsatisfactory as an explanation of these parameters (case 2).
We would prefer to recognize that the data here have three distinct modes, located at 4,
13, and 87.
Unlike the stochastic parameters approach, the parameter distributions allowed by group
models can naturally account for multimodality in individual diﬀerences. By postulating
two groups, for instance, we arrive at a bimodal distribution. While this is desirable, given
our goal of learning group structure from data, it introduces the problem of how many
groups we should include in our individual diﬀerences model. In ﬁnite group models, this
is viewed as a model selection problem. The ﬁxed number of groups k is taken to deﬁne a
family of individual diﬀerences distributionsMk, and we are required to determine which
of these families is best for our data. As a result, model selection issues are central to the
application of group models to psychological data, and often make statistical inference very
diﬃcult computationally. In this paper we explore an inﬁnite groups models, which retains
the ﬂexibility of the ﬁnite groups model but allows straightforward inference. Questions of
model selection will still arise, but in a diﬀerent and more theoretically satisfying fashion.
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3 The Inﬁnite Groups Model
Although the inﬁnite groups model has implications for the model selection problem, it
is motivated by a more psychological concern with ﬁnite group models. The statistical
model described in Equation 3 assumes that k is a ﬁxed value, independent of sample
size. Such a model requires, rather implausibly, that future subjects will belong to one
of the same set of k groups that were observed previously. No provision is made in this
model for the idea that, should more data be observed, more groups could be observed. In
contrast, we start with the assumption that there are an inﬁnite number of latent groups,
only some number of which are observed in any ﬁnite sample. The consequence is that k
is now variable, and can grow with the data.
To build the inﬁnite groups model, we adopt a distribution on individual parameters θ that
is more ﬂexible than the parametric distribution assumed by the stochastic parameters
model, but still allows eﬃcient inference. We assume that subjects are drawn from an
inﬁnite number of groups, taking G(· |φ) to be a weighted combination of an inﬁnite
number of point masses, as in Figure 3c. That is, the individual diﬀerences model is
assumed to be of the form,
G(· |w, θ) =
∞∑
z=1
wz δ(· | θz). (4)
Once again, δ(· | θz) denotes a point mass distribution located at θz, and since the wz
values denote mixture weights, they must sum to 1. While we assume that the number of
groups is unbounded, any ﬁnite set of subjects will contain representatives from a ﬁnite
subset of these groups. This model is psychologically plausible: People can vary in any
number of ways, only some of which will be observed in a ﬁnite sample. With inﬁnitely
many groups, there is always the possibility that a new subject can display behavior that
has never been seen before.
3.1 Finite-Dimensional Priors
In order to apply Bayesian inference in the hierarchical model deﬁned by Equations 1
and 4, we need to deﬁne a prior π(·) over the possible individual diﬀerences models G(·).
A speciﬁc individual diﬀerences model is deﬁned by the the countably inﬁnite number of
elements of w and θ in Equation 4, where wz denotes the probability that G(·) assigns
to the zth point mass, and θz denotes the location of that point mass. In other words,
we need a prior over the inﬁnite dimensional space W×Θ that covers the possible values
for the parameter vectors w ∈ W and θ ∈ Θ. To see how we might place a sensible prior
on this inﬁnite dimensional space, it is helpful to consider how we might proceed in the
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ﬁnite case when G(·) consists of only k point masses, and then take the limit as k →∞.
This approach is a standard way of eliciting inﬁnite-dimensional priors (e.g., Neal, 2000;
Rasmussen, 2000; Green & Richardson, 2001; Griﬃths & Ghahramani, 2005). Note that
this procedure does not explicitly derive the prior distribution itself. Rather, it provides
a principled motivation for a particular choice of prior.
In a ﬁnite groups model with k groups (i.e., Equation 3), a standard prior is
θz ∼ G0(·)
w |α, k ∼ Dirichlet(· | ζ).
(5)
In this prior, each of the k location parameters θz is sampled independently from the base
distribution G0(·). This base distribution provides a prior over the kinds of parameter
values that are likely to capture human performance in a particular task. Choosing the
base distribution is no diﬀerent to setting a prior in any other Bayesian context, and so
this prior should be chosen in the usual way. That said, there are diﬀering views as to what
ought to be the ‘usual way’ (e.g., de Finetti, 1974; DeGroot; 1970; Kass & Wasserman,
1996; Jaynes, 2003), but it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss this debate between
subjective and objective views of Bayesian inference. Whatever approach is adopted, the
base distribution G0(·) is not aﬀected when we make the transition from ﬁnite models to
inﬁnite models.
For our purposes, the relevant part of this prior is the distribution over the weights.
Placing a prior over the weights is made diﬃcult by the constraint that they need to sum
to 1. Typically, in the ﬁnite case, we would use a k-dimensional Dirichlet distribution as a
prior over these weights. The general form for a k-dimensional Dirichlet with parameters
ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζk) is given by,







where I(w) = 1 if the weights w sum to 1, and I(w) = 0 otherwise. The Dirichlet distri-
bution is a higher-dimensional version of the Beta distribution, with the Beta distribution
corresponding to the case where k = 2. The normalizing function Z(ζ) for the Dirichlet















In this expression Γ(y) =
∫∞
0 u
y−1e−u du is the standard Gamma function, which gener-
alizes the factorial function: If y is a non-negative integer, then Γ(y + 1) = y! When the
Dirichlet distribution is used as a prior in a ﬁnite groups model, it is typical to use a
symmetric Dirichlet distribution in which all parameters are equal. The reason for using
a symmetric distribution stems from the prior being insensitive to the ordering of the lo-
cation parameters θ. Since the location parameters are independent of one another, their
order (i.e., the value of the index z) is irrelevant. This exchangeability requires that the
prior over w be set so that the index is also irrelevant, which is achieved by setting a
symmetric prior.
For the purposes of deriving a prior over inﬁnite groups, we will assume that all parameter
values ζz are set to α/k. The choice of α/k as the parameter value follows from recognizing
that the sum of the parameters of a Dirichlet distribution can be interpreted as indicating
how heavily to weight the prior. To understand this property of the Dirichlet parameters
it may help to consider an example using an idealized bent coin. Suppose that data are
produced by n independent ﬂips of a bent coin. We might propose a simple model, in which
these are i.i.d. Bernoulli trials with an unknown probability p of obtaining a head. The
prior we set over this unknown p could be Dirichlet with only k = 2 possible outcomes,
corresponding to a Beta distribution. Since we do not know which way the coin is bent,
the distribution over p should be symmetric. We will set the parameters to α/2. If we
then observe h heads and t = n − h tails in our data, our posterior distribution is still a
Beta, since the Beta family is conjugate 1 to the Binomial likelihood. The parameters of
the posterior Beta are h + α/2 and t + α/2. As a result, the expected posterior value of
p is p¯ = (h + α/2)/(n + α). From the denominator, it is evident that α is commensurate
with n, in terms of its inﬂuence on this estimate. This property generalizes to larger k.
Our goal here is to specify a prior over an inﬁnite-dimensional outcome space W that
embodies only a limited amount of information, so it is helpful to choose the prior in a
way that keeps the amount of information independent of the dimensionality k. The α/k
prior achieves this by ensuring that the sum of the parameter vector is always α. For more
details on the α/k prior, see Neal (2000) and Ishwaran and Zarepour (2002).
To ﬁnd the limiting prior as k →∞, it is helpful to to rewrite the ﬁnite-dimensional model
in a way that lets us integrate out w. To do this, we introduce the group membership
variable gi, indicating the group to which the ith observation belongs. Since wz gives
the probability that the ith observation belongs to the zth group, we can say that p(gi =
z |w) = wz. With this membership variable introduced, the ﬁnite-dimensional model with
1 A family of prior distributions is conjugate to a particular likelihood function if the posterior
distribution belongs to the same family as the prior (e.g., Bernardo & Smith, 2000, pp. 265–285).
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this prior becomes,
xij |θ, gi = z ∼ F (· | θz)
gi |w ∼ Multinomial(· |w)
w |α, k ∼ Dirichlet(· | α
k
)
θz |G0 ∼ G0(·),
(8)
where the multinomial is of sample size one. Since the group assignment variables gi are
conditionally independent given the weights w, when we integrate out the weights we
induce a conditional dependence between the group assignments. If we have observed the
ﬁrst i − 1 group assignments g−i = (g1, . . . , gi−1), we want the conditional probability
p(gi = z | g−i, α, k) that is obtained by integrating out w. This distribution is given by,
p(gi = z | g−i, α, k) =
∫
p(gi = z |w)p(w | g−i, α, k) dw.
We have already seen that p(gi = z |w) = wz. By applying Bayes’ theorem we observe
that the second term is the posterior probability,
p(w | g−i, α, k) ∝ p(g−i |w)p(w |α, k).
Since the ﬁrst term is a multinomial probability and the second term is Dirichlet, conju-
gacy implies that the posterior is also Dirichlet. If we let sz denote the number of previous
observations that were assigned to group z, we can use the size vector s = (s1, . . . , sk) to in-
dicate how many observations fall in each group. The posterior probability p(w | g−i, α, k)
is a non-symmetric Dirichlet with the parameter vector s + α/k. We can now solve the
integral.































i− 1 + α. (9)
In this expression, 1(z) is a k-length vector of zeros with a 1 in position z. The last line
follows from Equation 7 and the fact that Γ(y + 1) = yΓ(y).
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3.2 Extension to Inﬁnite-Dimensional Priors
The ﬁnite-dimensional prior can now be extended to the inﬁnite case by letting k → ∞
(see Neal, 2000; Ishwaran & Zarepour, 2002). Consider ﬁrst the probability that the ith
observation falls in a group z that already contains at least one member (i.e. sz > 0). In
this case, the limiting probability is










i− 1 + α. (10)
We now consider the probability that the ith observation falls in one of the inﬁnitely many
groups that as yet contain no observations. If there are k−i groups observed among the
ﬁrst i− 1 observations, and letting Q denote the set of k − k−i currently empty groups,
then the probability that the ith observation belongs to one of them is,




















i− 1 + α. (11)
Notice that α remains commensurate with sample size in the limiting prior (in the deriva-
tion above the sample size is i − 1) and so can be interpreted as a measure of prior
information. In the bent coin example, α acted to drag the estimator toward the prior,
thereby shaping predictions about future data. In the inﬁnite groups model, large α in-
creases the probability that future data will be drawn from a previously unobserved group.
Since new groups have parameter values drawn from the prior G0(·), larger α increases
the inﬂuence of the prior. Moreover, since large α values tend to introduce more groups,
it can be thought of as a dispersion parameter.
The group assignments gi deﬁne a partition of the subjects, with each subject being as-
signed to a single group. The distribution over partitions induced by taking the limit of
a Dirichlet-multinomial model, as we did in Equations 10 and 11, is the same as that in-
duced by a stochastic process called the Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP: e.g., Aldous,
1995; Pitman, 1996) with dispersion α. The CRP gets its name from a metaphor based
on Chinese restaurants in San Francisco that seem to have limitless seating capacity. In
this metaphor, every possible group corresponds to a table in an inﬁnitely large Chinese
restaurant. Each observation corresponds to a customer entering the restaurant and sit-
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ting at a table. People are assumed to prefer sitting at popular tables (with probability
proportional to the number of people already sitting at the table), but it is always possible
for them to choose a new table (with probability proportional to α). This gives exactly the
conditional distribution over group assignments obtained in Equations 10 and 11, with
the joint distribution over group assignments written g |α ∼ CRP (· |α). The resulting
model becomes
xij | θz, gi = z ∼ F (· | θz)
g |α ∼ CRP (· |α)
θz |G0 ∼ G0(·).
(12)
To complete the motivation of our prior, it is helpful to ﬁnd the prior distribution over
parameter values θi, by integrating out the group assignment variables gu. Since these are
just indicator variables, this is straightforward:
θi |θ−i, α,G0 ∼ α




i− 1 + αδ(· | θz). (13)
To avoid confusion, it is important to recognize that θz denotes the parameter value
associated with all the members of group z, whereas θ−i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1) denotes parame-
ters assigned to particular observations, as does θi. The conditional probability described
in Equation 13 is a mixture between the empirical distribution of the i − 1 previously
observed parameters and the base distribution G0(·).
A sequence of parameter values sampled from Equation 13 is sometimes said to be sampled
from a Po´lya urn (PU: e.g., Blackwell & MacQueen, 1973) parameterized by G0(·) and α.
In a Po´lya urn scheme, we imagine an urn full of α colored balls, such that the proportion
of balls with color θ is equal to G0(θ). We sample θ1 by drawing a ball at random from
the urn and recording its color. We then return the ball to the urn and drop in another
ball of the same color, eﬀectively “updating” the urn. Using this Po´lya urn formulation
to express the induced prior on θ, our model may be written,
xij | θi ∼ F (· | θi)
θ1, . . . , θ∞ |G0, α ∼ PU (· |G0, α).
(14)
This description now allows us to select an appropriate inﬁnite-dimensional prior: We
want to choose a prior over the individual diﬀerences distribution G(·), subject to the
constraint that the marginal prior over the set of individual parameters θ1, . . . , θ∞ is a
Po´lya urn scheme. As noted by Blackwell and MacQueen (1973), one prior that meets








































Fig. 4. Three graphical representations of a model employing a Dirichlet process prior. Each
panel depicts the same model, but shown from a diﬀerent perspective. Panel a depicts the
standard view (Equation 15), panel b shows the Sethuraman construction (Equation 16) and
panel c displays the construction via the Po´lya urn scheme (Equation 14).
The Dirichlet process is widely used in nonparametric Bayesian statistics as a method
for placing priors on inﬁnite mixture models (e.g., Lo, 1984; Escobar & West, 1995; Ras-
mussen, 2000; Neal, 1996, 2000; Blei, Griﬃths, Jordan & Tenenbaum, 2004), and has
sometimes been applied in psychometrics as a generic prior over probability distributions
in Bayesian Item Response Theory models (e.g., Duncan, 2004; Qin, 1998). This con-
nection between the Dirichlet process and the Po´lya urn scheme suggests that our prior
on the individual diﬀerences distribution should be a Dirichlet process. Having elicited a
principled prior, we may now formally specify the inﬁnite groups model in the following
way:
xij | θi ∼ F (· | θi)
θi |G ∼ G(·)
G |G0, α ∼ DP (· |G0 , α).
(15)
This model is illustrated graphically in Figure 4a. Parameters arise from an unknown
distribution G(·), and our uncertainty about this distribution is reﬂected through the
Dirichlet process prior. Grey circles denote observed variables, white circles denote latent
variables, and the rounded squares denote parameters whose values are assumed to be
known. Plates indicate a set of independent replications of the processes inside them
(Buntine, 1994). For comparison, the Po´lya urn formulation in Equation 14 is shown in
panel c.
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4 The Dirichlet Process
In nonparametric problems, the goal is to learn from data without making any strong as-
sumptions about the class of parametric distributions (e.g., Gaussian) that might describe
the data. The rationale for the approach is that the generative process for a particular
data set is unlikely to belong to any ﬁnite-dimensional parametric family, so it would be
preferable to avoid making this false assumption at the outset. From a Bayesian perspec-
tive, nonparametric assumptions require us to place a prior distribution that has broad
support across the space of probability distributions. However, Bayesian nonparametrics
are not widely known in psychology (but see Karabatsos, in press), so a brief discussion
may be helpful.
The Dirichlet process, now a standard prior in Bayesian nonparametrics, was constructed
by Freedman (1963) during a discussion of tail-free processes, and the associated statis-
tical theory was developed by Ferguson (1973, 1974). The Dirichlet process represents a
partial solution to the problem of Bayesian nonparametric inference, in the sense that it
does have broad support, but the sampled distributions are discrete with probability 1
(e.g., Ferguson, 1973; Blackwell, 1973; Sethuraman, 1994; Ghosh & Ramamoorthi, 2003,
pp. 102-103). As a result it is often used as a prior over discrete distributions 2 and it is
in this capacity that we have used the Dirichlet process in this paper. Since we require
an inﬁnite number of variables (the countably inﬁnite elements of w and θ) to describe a
sample from the Dirichlet process, it is often referred to as an inﬁnite-dimensional model.
4.1 Stick-Breaking Priors
The simplest description of the Dirichlet process is as an example of a stick-breaking prior
(e.g., Ishwaran & James, 2001; Ishwaran & Zarepour, 2002). This construction was ﬁrst
discussed by McCloskey (1965), and formalized by Sethuraman (1994). In this formulation,




wz δ(· | θz),
2 One reason for the popularity of the Dirichlet process is tractability, since the Dirichlet process
is conjugate to i.i.d. sampling (Ferguson, 1973). If the prior over G(·) is a Dirichlet process




i=1 δ(· | θi), then the posterior distribution over G(·) is a Dirichlet process with dispersion
α + n and base distribution αα+nG0(·) + nα+nGn(·). However, it is important to note that since
the Dirichlet process concentrates on discrete distributions, it can be unsuitable as a prior
over densities. For instance, Diaconis and Freedman (1986) provide an example of pathological

























Fig. 5. A graphical depiction of the stick-breaking process, showing successive breaks of a stick
with starting length one, and how the lengths of the pieces correspond to sampled weights.
as per Equation 4. Since the distribution can be described by the inﬁnite set of point
masses θz and the inﬁnite set of weights wz, this construction speciﬁes two separate
priors. As illustrated in Figure 4b, the base distribution places a prior over the locations
of the point masses, while the dispersion parameter can be used to place a stick-breaking
prior over their weights, denoted Stick(1, α). In other words, an inﬁnite mixture model
that uses a Dirichlet process prior (i.e. Equation 15) can be rewritten,
xij | θ1, . . . , θ∞, gi = z ∼ F (· | θz)
gi |w1, . . . , w∞ ∼ Multinomial(· |w1, . . . , w∞)
w1, . . . , w∞ |α ∼ Stick(· | 1, α)
θz |G0 ∼ G0(·),
(16)
where the multinomial distribution in the second line is of sample size 1. The stick-
breaking process can be illustrated in the following way. Imagine we started with a stick
of length 1, broke it in two, and took the length of one of the pieces to be the ﬁrst weight.
We then broke the remaining piece in two, using one of the resulting pieces as the second
weight. This process continues for a countably inﬁnite number of breaks, as illustrated in
Figure 5, and results in an inﬁnite set of stick-lengths that sum to 1 with probability 1.
More formally, at each step of the process the proportion of the stick w′z that is broken
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oﬀ follows a Beta distribution 3 , so that
w′z |α ∼ Beta(· | 1, α).







A nice property of the stick-breaking construction is that it allows us to draw approximate
samples from the Dirichlet process, by sampling the values of wz from the stick-breaking
process until the sum of the observed values is suﬃciently close to 1. Having done so, we
then sample the corresponding θz values independently from G0(·), and treat the resulting
(sub)probability distribution as an approximation to G(·). By doing this, we can get a
sense of what these distributions look like. Figure 6 shows three distributions sampled
from three diﬀerent choices of G0(·), and a dispersion parameter value of α = 100 in
each case. As is immediately apparent, the base distribution places a prior on the shape
of G(·). By way of comparison, Figure 7 shows a number of distributions sampled from
a Dirichlet process with a uniform distribution over [0, 1] as the base distribution G0(·),
and dispersion parameters of α = 100 (top row), α = 20 (middle row), and α = 5
(bottom row). It illustrates the manner in which smaller values of α tend to concentrate
the distribution on fewer values of θz.
4.2 Learning the Dispersion of Data
A diﬃculty with Dirichlet process models, noted by Antoniak (1974), is that it is usually
too restrictive to specify a value of α a priori. The dispersion parameter reﬂects the
degree of variability in the parameter values, and is something we would prefer to learn
from data. In order to do so, we ﬁrst need to understand the relationship between the
dispersion α and the number of groups k that will manifest among n subjects. Note that
k now refers not to the ‘true’ number of groups, but to the number of manifest groups.
Antoniak (1974) shows that the probability p(k |α, n) that k groups will be observed in
n samples from a model with a Dirichlet process prior is






3 In the more general class of stick-breaking priors the parameters of the Beta variate can vary












































Fig. 6. Distributions sampled from a Dirichlet process with α = 100, and three diﬀerent base
distributions G0(·). Base distributions are shown on the left, and sampled distributions are
shown on the right. In the top line, the base distribution is Beta(· | 10, 2), while in the middle
row it is a uniform Beta(· | 1, 1), while in the bottom row it is an equal mixture of a Beta(· | 10, 1)
and a Beta(· | 1, 10).
∝ znkαk,





u−1(1 − η)v−1dη is a standard Beta function and znk is
an unsigned Stirling number of the ﬁrst kind. The unsigned Stirling numbers count the
number of permutations of n objects having k permutation cycles (Abramowitz & Stegun,
1972, pp. 824), and are found by taking the absolute value of the corresponding signed
Stirling numbers znk = |snk|. There is no analytic expression for snk, but it is easily
calculated using the recurrence formula snk = sn−1,k−1 − (n − 1)sn−1,k, and the special
cases snn = 1 for all n and sn0 = 0 for n > 0. Note that the use of s and z in this notation
is unrelated to the previous use as the group sizes and indices (the two uses will not come
into conﬂict). Antoniak (1974) also observes that the expected number of components
sampled from a Dirichlet process is given by,
E[k |α, n] =
n∑
k=1




















Fig. 7. Distributions sampled from a Dirichlet process with a uniform distribution over [0, 1] as
the base distribution G0(·), and dispersion parameters of α = 100 (left), α = 20 (middle), and
α = 5 (right). In all cases there are a countably inﬁnite number of components (most of which
are too small to see), but the distributions vary in the extent to which the probability mass is












Thus, although k → ∞ with probability 1 as n → ∞ (Korwar & Hollander, 1973), the
number of components increases in approximately logarithmically with the number of
observations. This is illustrated in Figure 8a, which shows how the prior over the number
of components grows changes as a function of n, for a Dirichlet process with α = 10.
In many contexts the dispersion α is unknown, so we specify a prior distribution p(α),
allowing us to learn α from data. The resulting model is known as a Dirichlet process
mixture. Antoniak (1974) notes that the the posterior distribution for α is inﬂuenced only
by the number of distinct groups k, and not by the details of the allocation of observations
to those groups. Therefore, since p(k |α, n) provides the likelihood function for k, we can
apply Equation 17 to ﬁnd the posterior distribution over α given some observed data
containing k groups. Since the prior on α is not dependent on the sample size n, we may
write,
p(α | k, n)∝ p(k |α, n) p(α |n)
= p(k |α, n) p(α)
∝B(α, n)αk p(α). (19)
A common choice for p(α) is the (inverse) Gamma distribution α | a, b ∼ Gamma(· | a, b) in
which p(α) ∝ αa−1e−bα (Escobar & West, 1995). If so, the posterior distribution becomes,
p(α | k, n) ∝ αa+k−1e−bα B(α, n). (20)
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Fig. 8. Prior distributions over the number of components k for sample sizes n ranging from 1 to
25. The panel on the left shows the prior for a Dirichlet process with dispersion α = 10, where
the area of each rectangle is proportional to the probability associated with the corresponding
value of k for a given n. The panel on the right shows the marginal prior over k for a Dirichlet
process mixture in which the prior over α is an inverse Gamma(· | 10−10, 10−10) distribution.
In particular, Escobar and West (1995) note that if we let a → 0 and b → 0 we ob-
tain a so-called scale-invariant prior in which p(α) ∝ 1/α (e.g., Jeﬀreys, 1961; Kass &
Wasserman, 1996). However, since this Gamma(· | 0, 0) prior is improper, we have chosen
to approximate it with the proper but extremely similar prior Gamma(· | 10−10, 10−10).
Figure 8b shows the marginal prior over k resulting from this choice of prior.
5 Model Selection With Inﬁnite Groups
One beneﬁt to the inﬁnite groups model is the principled perspective that it provides on
the model order selection problem. Since model order selection problems are commonplace
in psychological modeling (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Griﬃths & Steyvers, 2004; Lee,
2001; Lee & Navarro, 2005) it is worth discussing this point in a little more detail.
When working with ﬁnite models, it is natural to think of k as the intrinsic model order.
Every value of k describes a diﬀerent family of distributions in Equation 3, and so it is
easy to think of k as deﬁning a model Mk consisting of all discrete distributions that
consist of exactly k point masses. This means that, when inferring a ﬁnite group model
to account for individual diﬀerences, we need to address the model selection question of
choosing a modelMk, and a parameter estimation problem in which we pick a distribution
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G(·) ∈Mk. From a Bayesian standpoint (e.g., Wasserman, 2000) we would ﬁnd a posterior
distribution over the models p(Mk |x) and use this to draw our inference about k. In order
to ﬁnd this posterior, we need a prior distribution p(Mk). However, since it is not easy
to see how this prior might be chosen, it is quite common to use Bayes factors (e.g., Kass
& Raftery, 1995). This corresponds implicitly to the use of a uniform prior over model
orders, which may not be appropriate. 4 It seems unlikely, for example, that experimental
data from 40 subjects—thus requiring the consideration of model orders 1, 2, . . . , 40—is
equally as likely to contain 23 diﬀerent groups of subjects as it is to contain two diﬀerent
groups of subjects.
The inﬁnite groups model takes a diﬀerent view. By assuming that the distribution G(·)
has an inﬁnite number of groups, we no longer have any model classes to select between.
In this framework, we view k as the variable expression of G(·) through ﬁnite data. When
we set a prior in this approach, it is over the distributions themselves: A prior that we have
derived from basic considerations about the structure of the model. This, in turn, implies
a prior over k that reﬂects the rate at which new groups are expected to appear when
sampling from G(·). At no point do we need to specify artiﬁcial model classes. Moreover,
since the natural way to think about inference is to do posterior sampling over G(·), the
number of observed groups k will emerge in inferring G(·), rather than via a dedicated
model selection procedure.
6 Modeling Discrete Data With Inﬁnite Groups
We now turn to the speciﬁcation and application of the inﬁnite groups model to situations
in which subjects provide discrete data. Suppose that n people perform some task in which
m possible responses can be made on each trial, and the ith person experiences ri trials.
We will specify a simple cognitive model in which there is a multinomial distribution with
parameter vector θi = (θi1, . . . , θim) for the behavior of participant i. In this situation, the
natural way to describe data from the ith participant is with the vector xi = (xi1, . . . , xim),
in which xih counts the number of times that participant i made response h. Note that
this is a slight change from the previous notation, since xi is now a vector of counts rather
than a list of the outcomes for every trial. Since our cognitive model is multinomial, it is
natural to use a Dirichlet distribution as the prior over θi. Speciﬁcally, we will assume a
symmetric Dirichlet base distribution with parameter β. This cognitive model, including
4 Note that Lee and Webb’s (in press) approach to ﬁnite group selection is a little diﬀerent to
standard model order selection. Rather than placing an implicit uniform prior over k, they use
an implicit uniform prior over the possible partitions of n subjects.
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the prior, is written
xi |θi ∼ Multinomial(· |θi)
θi |β ∼ Dirichlet(· |β).
If we now assume that each person belongs to one of an inﬁnite number of latent groups, we
would incorporate an individual diﬀerences model by assuming that each parameter value
θi is drawn from some discrete distribution G(·), and use the Dirichlet process to place a
prior over these distributions. However, since we do not wish to make strong assumptions
about the dispersion parameter α, we use the Dirichlet process mixture model in which
we assume that α follows an inverse Gamma distribution. If we write this model using
the stick-breaking notation (as in Equation 16), we obtain the model
xi |θ1, . . . , θ∞, gi = z ∼ Multinomial(· |θz)
gi |w1, . . . , w∞ ∼ Multinomial(· |w1, . . . , w∞)
w1, . . . , w∞ |α ∼ Stick(· | 1, α)
α | a, b ∼ Gamma(· | a, b)
θz |β ∼ Dirichlet(· |β),
(21)
where the multinomial in the second line is of sample size 1. The model is illustrated
in Figure 9. Performing inference in this inﬁnite groups model using the mixture of
Dirichlet processes prior means being able to estimate the joint posterior distribution
p(g, θ, α |x, a, b, β). A straightforward Gibbs sampling scheme for drawing samples from
this posterior distribution is presented in the Appendix. From these posterior samples we
can construct estimates of the posterior distribution itself using some density estimation
technique (e.g., Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman, 2001, pp. 182–190).
Using this model to make inferences from data there are several marginal posteriors that
are of particular interest, corresponding to diﬀerent theoretical questions. Some examples
include:
(1) How many groups? This question corresponds to the model order selection problem,
by asking how many groups are manifest in the data. To answer this, we want to
know p(k |x), the posterior probability that there are k distinct groups in the sample
x. Notice that this is a property of the observed data, not an inference about a
population parameter.
(2) How dispersed is the population? The complementary question to (1) is to ask how
groups might be distributed in the population. Of course, in an inﬁnite population

















Fig. 9. Dependencies in the inﬁnite groups model for discrete data as it is used here. Shaded
circles denote observed variables, white circles are latent variables, rounded squares denote
known parameter values, and plates indicate a set of independent replications of the processes
shown inside them.
the posterior distribution over the dispersion parameter. If most subjects fall into a
single group, then the posterior over α will place most mass on small values, since
the population is unlikely to be highly dispersed.
(3) What are the groups? Clearly, in drawing inferences about the sample we want to
know not just how many groups there are, but also which people tend to belong to
the same groups. In this case, we want to know p(g |x). In some cases, we might
want to ﬁnd the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate for the group structure,
namely gˆ = argmaxg p(g |x). Alternatively, we might aim to get a sense for the
full distribution p(g |x) by ﬁnding speciﬁc groupings that consistently appear in the
posterior.
(4) What performance characterizes a group? The original motivation for proposing a
groups model was to learn which subjects could be characterized in the same way.
Having inferred that some subjects belong to the same group, we would like to know
what parameter values of the cognitive model describe their performance. In this case,
we want to know p(θ |x, g), or some other summary measure for this distribution
such as E[p(θ |x, g)].
To provide a simple illustration of the performance of the model in the context of the
ﬁrst question “how many groups?”, we created random data sets with n = 100 people
and r = 100 discrete observations per person, where each observation denotes a choice of
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Fig. 10. Simulations in which n = 100 people provide s = 100 observations each, and m = 20
response options are possible on every trial. The true number of groups varies from 5 to 25. After
a burn-in of only 500 samples, and using only a single draw from the posterior distribution, the
Gibbs sampler performs reasonably well.
one of m = 20 response options. The sample was divided into k groups, and each group
associated with a multinomial rate θ sampled from a uniform distribution. People were
allocated randomly to groups, subject to the constraint that each group contained at least
one member. The number of groups in the data varied from 5 to 25, with 500 data sets
generated for each. For each data set, we ran the Gibbs sampler for 500 iterations and then
drew a single sample from the posterior distribution. Figure 10 plots the distribution over
the recovered number of groups as a function of the true number of groups represented in
the data. Inspection of this ﬁgure shows that, for the most part, the Gibbs sampler recovers
the appropriate number of groups in the data. There is a slight tendency to underestimate
the number of groups in some cases, but as argued by Kontkanen et al. (2005), this is not
undesirable behavior when extracting a partition, since it generally reﬂects “diﬀerent”
groups with parameter values so similar that they cannot be distinguished without much







Fig. 11. The category densities used in McKinley and Nosofsky’s (1995) experiment 2. Category
A (dark grey) is a mixture of four Gaussians, while category B (light grey) is a mixture of two
Gaussians. The 30%, 60% and 90% conﬁdence ellipses are shown for each of the six densities.
7 Individual Diﬀerences in Categorization
We now present an application of the inﬁnite groups model. An elegant category learning
experiment by McKinley and Nosofsky (1995) investigated 10 people’s 5 ability to dis-
criminate between the two probabilistic categories shown in Figure 11. The stimuli were
circles with a radial line running through them, and so the two dimensions depicted in
Figure 11 correspond to the radius of the circle, and the angle of the line. Category A
(dark grey) is a mixture of four Gaussian distributions, while category B (light grey) is a
mixture of two Gaussians. On any given trial in the experiment, a stimulus was sampled
from one of the six Gaussian distributions. Subjects were asked whether it came from
category A or category B, and provided feedback as to the accuracy of their response.
Because the categories are inherently probabilistic and the category densities are quite
complicated, this task is very diﬃcult, and shows evidence of diﬀerences not only during
the course of category learning, but in the ﬁnal structures learned.
In order to learn about the variation between subjects, we applied the inﬁnite groups
model to the data from this experiment. In doing so, we were interested in how the sub-
5 McKinley and Nosofsky (1995) actually report data for 11 subjects. However, the data cur-
rently available to us include only 10 of these.
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jects’ classiﬁcation performance varied as a function of the source. For the ith participant



















the number of correct responses to stimuli generated from distribution l. We are also

















many trials of each type appeared in each subjects’ data. The natural thing to model
is the probability of making the correct response to stimuli sampled from each of the
six components. So the model would model would predict that for the ith participant,
p(Correct | Sample from A1) = θ(A1)i . The cognitive model therefore describes binomial
distributions, so that if the ith participant belongs to group z,
x
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for all l ∈ (A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2), and where the binomial is of sample size r(l)i . Group















where each element of this vector is a binomial rate. The fact that we have speciﬁed a
multidimensional space for x and θ has no bearing on the stick-breaking prior over w, so
it is still appropriate to write the inﬁnite discrete groups model as
gi |w1, . . . , w∞ ∼ Multinomial(· |w1, . . . , w∞)
w1, . . . , w∞ |α ∼ Stick(· | 1, α)
α | a, b ∼ Gamma(· | a, b).
The only modiﬁcation that we need to make is to specify a multidimensional base dis-
tribution G0(·). To do so, we assume that each of the binomials has the same symmetric
Beta prior, implying that
θ(l)z ∼ Beta(· |β),
for all l ∈ (A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2).
For each of the 10 subjects we used only the last 300 trials of the experiment, in order
to look for diﬀerences in the learned category structure, rather than diﬀerences in the
learning process itself. In order to conduct a Bayesian analysis, we set principled a priori
parameter values rather than ﬁtting the model to the data. Since we know that both
responses (i.e., “A” and “B”) are possible but are otherwise “ignorant”, the natural
choice for the base distribution is the uniform distribution (see Jaynes, 2003, pp. 382–
386), which is obtained by setting β = 1, and since we have no strong beliefs about α
we would like a scale-invariant prior (see Jeﬀreys, 1961) in which a → 0, b → 0. Once
again, in order to ensure a proper prior, we chose a = b = 10−10 as a compromise between
ignorance and propriety. To approximate the posterior distribution over α, k and other
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Fig. 12. Estimated posterior over k as a function of n. Assuming subjects arrive in a ﬁxed order,
from the ﬁrst to the tenth person, we can see that the number of inferred groups changes as
more people are observed. The area of the squares is proportional to the posterior probability
of k given n.































Fig. 13. Estimated posterior distributions over α and k when the inﬁnite groups model is applied
to McKinley and Nosofsky’s (1995) experiment 2.
relevant parameters, we used the Gibbs sampler to draw 10,000 samples from the joint
posterior distribution (after an initial burn-in period of 1,000 iterations), with a lag of 5
iterations between samples to minimize autocorrelation between samples.
We ﬁrst consider the question of selecting the model order (“how many groups?”) by
examining how the distribution p(k |x) changes as a function of n. To do this, we imagine
that the 10 subjects entered the lab in order of participant ID. Figure 12 shows how the
posterior distribution over k changes as more subjects are observed: the model grows with
the data. Initially there is evidence for only a single group, but once the 10th participant
is observed, there is strong evidence for about 3 or 4 groups. The last of these posterior
28
Table 1
Estimated probability with which subjects in McKinley and Nosofsky’s (1995) experiment 2
belong to the same group. For visual clarity, the probabilities are given as percentages.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 37 0 73 0 58 68 36 43 55
2 22 34 1 68 56 3 5 67
3 1 57 1 0 0 0 2
4 0 44 52 53 60 43
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 86 4 7 93
7 11 16 86
8 91 4
9 7
distributions (in the case when n = 10) is illustrated in Figure 13b. We can also use our
samples to ask about the amount of variability that we believe exists in the population
(“how much dispersion?”). Figure 13a shows the estimated posterior density p(α |x),
which indicates a strong preference for smaller values of α. However, with such a small
sample size, this distribution still reﬂects the near-ignorance prior that we chose for this
analysis.
Turning now to the third question (“what are the groups?”), the small number of subjects
allows us to present a nice summary of the behavior of the posterior distribution p(g |x).
To do so, Table 1 shows the estimated (marginal) posterior probability that any two
subjects belong to the same group. This table reveals a rich pattern of similarities and
diﬀerences, indicating that the relationships between subjects is not arbitrary. To illustrate
this, we turn to a characterization of the groups themselves (“what performance?”). For
these data, it is most informative to plot some of the raw data rather than report parameter
values, because the data have a natural two-dimensional graphical structure while the
parameters are naturally six-dimensional. Figure 14 plots the last 300 stimuli observed by
subjects 5, 7, 8 and 9, and the decisions that they made. Broadly speaking, participant 5
is sensitive only to variation along the x-axis, participant 7 is sensitive only to variation
on the y-axis, while subjects 8 and 9 do a good job of learning the category structures
on both dimensions. As a result, subjects 5 and 7 rarely appear in the same group as
one another or with subjects 8 and 9 (with probabilities ranging from 0% to 7%), while
subjects 8 and 9 almost always (91%) co-occur. In other words, the relational structure
implied by Table 1 reﬂects the qualitative individual diﬀerences that are apparent from
visual inspection of Figure 14.
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participant 5 participant 7
participant 8 participant 9
Fig. 14. Last 300 trials for subjects 5, 7, 8 and 9 in McKinley and Nosofsky’s (1995) experiment
2. Black dots denote “A” responses, and grey dots denote “B” responses.
8 Individual Diﬀerences Among Psychologists
Another application of the inﬁnite groups model regards the publication habits of psychol-
ogists. As an initial investigation, we took the publication lists posted on the websites of
staﬀ in psychology departments at the following six institutions: Boston College, Cardiﬀ
University, Johns Hopkins University, The University of Edinburgh, Florida Atlantic Uni-
versity and Colorado State University. This yielded a total of 125 academics publishing
in 254 outlets 6 . Since most academics list only recent or selected publications, the data
represent a subset of publication behavior that people prefer to announce. The distribu-
tion of the number of listed publications per academic was highly skewed (the skewness
was 5.25), with a median value of 7 and an interquartile range of 10.5.
6 The original data set contained 508 outlets, but half of them were missing from the analyzed
data set due to a corrupted ﬁle.
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Fig. 15. Estimated posterior distributions over α and k when the inﬁnite groups model is applied
to the publications data.
Using the inﬁnite groups model, we would like to learn the patterns of similarity and
diﬀerence in declared publication preferences among these authors. The model in this
case is straightforward version of the usual inﬁnite groups model, with a single group
corresponding to a multinomial distribution over the 254 outlets. Again, we start only
with the belief that any author is able to publish in any outlet, implying that β = 1. Not
knowing anything a priori about the dispersion, we set the prior by setting a = b = 10−10.
After an initial burn-in period of 1000 samples to ensure that the Gibbs sampler had
converged, we drew 10,000 samples from the posterior distribution over groups, with a
lag of 5 iterations between samples. The resulting posterior distributions over α and k are
shown in Figure 15, and suggest that there are most likely between 12 and 17 groups in
these data.
One diﬃculty with the analysis of these data is that the full posterior distribution over
group assignments cannot be displayed easily. In order to provide insight into the struc-
ture that the inﬁnite groups model extracts from these data, we undertook the following
analysis. We took a set of ten successive samples (again, with a lag of ﬁve) from the
Markov chain used to produce Figure 15, and averaged across the corresponding ten par-
titions to ﬁnd an estimate for the expected probability with which each academic belongs
to each group. In order to interpret the groups, we can list the names of the people that
are expected to belong to them. Alternatively, we can ﬁnd the “prototypical performance”
associated with each group. In this case, we can calculate the expected probability with
which a group member publishes in a particular journal. A simple way of interpreting
the groups is to provide a list of typical journals for each group, since journal names are
highly informative, whereas the author names often are not.
Note that this is a rather diﬀerent analysis to the one we would obtain if we partitioned
the journals themselves. In this case we are interested in groups of people, and measure
their common behavior in terms of the journals they publish in. This does not necessarily
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Table 2
Prototypical journals for the ﬁve most prominant author-clusters. The rankings are based on
data that are normalized for the base rates of both journals and authors. All ﬁve represent
structures that are found across most of the posterior distribution.
1. Cognitive Psychology
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance
Brain & Language
Perception & Psychophysics
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
2. Behavioral Psychology
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology




Journal of Personality & Social Psychology
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin
Cognition & Emotion
Social Cognition
The Behavioral & Brain Sciences
4. Developmental Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Developmental Review
Infant Behavior and Development
Learning & Individual Diﬀerences
5. Medicine & Diﬀerential Psychology







Categories for the MSNBC.com web pages.
1. Front Page 7. Miscellaneous 13. Summary
2. News 8. Weather 14. Bulletin Board Service
3. Technology 9. Health 15. Travel
4. Local 10. Living 16. MSN-News
5. Opinion 11. Business 17. MSN-Sport
6. On-Air 12. Sports
produce partitions of journals, however, since multiple groups of people may use the same
journal. In short, the idea is we want groups of authors because we are interested in their
individual diﬀerences: in this analysis, journal usage is the “parameter” for a group of
authors, rather than the other way around. We should also mention the reason for using
a small number of nearby samples. In this analysis, we want to partially preserve the
autocorrelation between samples. This is because the full posterior distribution is likely
to be multimodal, and while “local averaging” across samples from the same peak is likely
to be beneﬁcial, averaging across samples from diﬀerent peaks would likely corrupt the
analysis. We repeated this procedure across a large number of randomly chosen locations
in the Markov chain, and looked for stable clusters of authors, deﬁned as those that
produced strong agreement in the rank ordering of journals.
Table 2 shows the top ﬁve journals for the ﬁve most prominant groups found in the pos-
terior distribution. As indicated by the labels, four of the ﬁve groups have a very natural
interpretation in terms of sub-ﬁelds within the discipline, namely cognitive, behavioral,
social and developmental psychology. The ﬁfth group contains journals that are represen-
tative of both medical research (e.g., Diabetic Medicine and British Medical Journal) and
diﬀerential psychology (e.g., Intelligence and Personality & Individual Diﬀerences). While
there is a possibility that this reﬂects a broader correlation in the interests of psychol-
ogists, it seems more likely that this cluster results from the multiple interests of some
members of our sample.
9 Individual Diﬀerences in Web Browsing
The ﬁnal application considers the behavior of 1000 people browsing on MSNBC.com
and news-related portions of MSN.com on September 28, 1999. Rather than record every
webpage viewed, each page is classiﬁed using one of the 17 categories listed in Table 3,
such as “news”, “technology” and “health”. For every user the data count the number
of times they visited pages belonging to each of the categories. The number of webpages
that belonged to each category varied from 10 to 5000. This data set is taken from a
much larger public database that records the behavior of all 989,818 (anonymous) users
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Fig. 16. Estimated posterior distributions over α and k when the inﬁnite groups model is applied
to the web data.
that visited MSNBC.com on that day, previously analyzed in some detail by Cadez et al.
(2003).
One reason for considering these data is that they represent the unconstrained behavior
of people engaged in a natural task. The analysis of large, natural data sets is not a
standard approach in cognitive psychology which has traditionally been dominated by
the experimental method. Although generally eﬀective, this approach tends to restrict
the domain of psychology to simplistic, often implausible contexts. As a complementary
approach, analyzing large data sets collected in rich environments provide a reﬂection of
real-world behavior and decision-making. By applying cognitive models in such contexts,
we may obtain insights that are not easily obtained in the laboratory.
To analyze these data using the inﬁnite groups model, we group visitors to the site by
the frequencies with which they visit each of the 17 categories of websites. Once again,
the cognitive model is a multinomial over the 17 categories, and we want to ﬁnd groups
of people who have the same multinomial. To do so, we again assume that β = 1 and
a = b = 10−10. After a burn-in of 1000 samples, we again drew 10,000 samples from the
posterior p(g |x) with a lag of 5 iterations between samples. The posterior distributions
over α and k are shown in Figure 16, and suggest that there are approximately 40 diﬀerent
groups represented among these 1000 people. In order to provide an interpretable summary
of the full posterior over groups, we repeated the analysis used in the last section, in
which we associate groups with an “expected performance proﬁle”. In this case, we ﬁnd
the expected distribution over the 17 categories for each diﬀerent group. However, since
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the make-up of many of the groups, we restrict
the analysis to a few of the prominent and consistent groups.
As with the publication data, there is evidence for stable groupings of people. Across
most of the posterior distribution we observe the three groups illustrated on the left hand
side of Figure 17. In each case, there is a group of people who visit only one type of
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web page, either “front page”, “summary” or “weather”. Given the extremely tight focus
of these distributions, we might safely conclude that these people were engaged in very
speciﬁc searches. Their interactions with the web environment were presumably oriented
towards a very speciﬁc objective (e.g., ﬁnd a weather report). On the other hand, there is
some evidence for groups such as those illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 17. In
these cases, people visited a range of diﬀerent pages, particularly “front page”, “news”,
“technology” and “on-air” pages. Distributed patterns of hits such as these suggest a
diﬀerent interpretation of user behavior. In these cases, people appear to be engaged in
exploratory search through the web environment (i.e., genuinely “browsing” rather than
simply “looking-up”).
There is a great deal of variety in the kinds of exploratory browsing patterns observed
across the posterior distribution. An exploratory analysis suggests that the clustering of
“front page”, “news” and “technology” pages is highly stable, in the sense that across
most of the posterior there exist large groups that assign high probability to all three
categories. However, there is a considerable degree of (apparently smooth) variation in
the relative interest in these three topics. This is illustrated in the comparison between
panels d and e in Figure 17, which show the same qualitative pattern of preferences, but
display subtle diﬀerences in the various probabilities. Moreover, when we consider panel
f, the same “clumping” of “front page”, “news”, “technology”, is observed, but with the
addition of “local” and “bulletin board service” instead of “on-air”. Finally, there is some
variation across the full posterior distribution in terms of the kinds of patterns it identiﬁes.
Taken together, these results suggest that, while the inﬁnite groups model is highly suc-
cessful at identifying the focused search behavior illustrated on the left hand side of
Figure 17, the more complex variation in exploratory browsing behavior is only captured
in part. The apparently smooth variation from panel d to panel e suggests that a more
complete account of individual diﬀerences in web browsing may require multimodal and
continuous parameter distributions. The fact that there are similarities between panel
d and panel f, for instance, suggests that we may need to explore models that allow
structured relationships between groups.
10 General Discussion
Cognitive models aim to describe and predict how people think and act. Since diﬀerent
people think and act in diﬀerent ways, we require models that allow us to learn complicated
patterns of variation. The individual diﬀerences framework outlined in this paper provides
a powerful method of representing the similarities and diﬀerences between people. By using
a group model we can capture multimodality in individual diﬀerences, thereby remaining
sensitive to the possibility of qualitative diﬀerences in performance. By adopting the


















































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 17. Six diﬀerent groups observed in the web data. In the three groups shown on the left,
people visited only one type of page, either “front page”, “summary” or “weather”. All three
groups on the right show a consistent tendency to visit “front page”, “news”, “technology” and
“on-air” pages, but with diﬀerent relative frequencies in each case. In addition, group (f) also
shows interest in “health” and “bulletin board” pages.
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fully explains the variation between individuals, but rather as representatives of a latent,
arbitrarily rich structure. Additionally, by placing a prior over the dispersion we are able
to learn about the extent of the the variability itself.
Our approach could be extended in a number of ways, enabling us to capture a greater
range of individual diﬀerences phenomena. One very simple extension would be to gen-
eralize the Dirichlet process prior to other stick-breaking priors. As Ishwaran and James
(2001) note, this family is quite general, incorporating the Poisson-Dirichlet process (Pit-
man & Yor, 1997) and Dirichlet-Multinomial processes (Muliere & Secchi, 1995) among
others. Alternatively, one might choose to move beyond priors over the discrete distribu-
tions, instead using a diﬀerent class of nonparametric priors, one that covers continuous
distributions such as Po´lya trees (Kraft, 1964; Ferguson, 1974) or Dirichlet diﬀusion trees
(Neal, 2003).
A diﬀerent extension to the framework can be motivated by returning to the unlucky
numbers experiment. In this example there is an issue regarding how to treat the one
person who responds 86. Does this person belong with the ten people who said 87? It may
be the case that this person is not a cricket fan, and is a representative of a genuinely
new group (fans of Agent 86 in the TV show Get Smart, perhaps). It is diﬃcult to
distinguish these cases, particularly since group models are rather unforgiving in their
requirement that all group members share the same parameter value. One of the merits
of the stochastic parameters approach is that it allows some smooth variation. If our data
consisted only of cricket fans, a stochastic parameters model would learn an individual
diﬀerences distribution centered on 87, since this is the typical behavior, but allow some
variability to be expressed. However, once we reintroduce the 13 group and the 4 group,
a unimodal stochastic parameter model will be inadequate.
A natural solution to this problem would be to build individual diﬀerences models that
capture the strengths of both frameworks. One approach would be to adopt an inﬁnite
stochastic groups model, which would produce multimodal continuous distributions by
convolving each point mass with a continuous distribution. In this approach, we would
assume that there are distinct groups of subjects in our data, as with the inﬁnite groups
approach. However, within a group we would allow there to be continuous, unimodal
variation, as with the stochastic parameters approach. Indeed, one of the reasons that
we have avoided conducting some sort of competition between the diﬀerent frameworks
is that they are designed to address diﬀerent phenomena. Accordingly, we feel that the
better approach is to pursue more powerful modeling frameworks that integrate the best
features of each.
Another direction for future work would be to allow structured relationships between
groups. One possibility would be to postulate a separate Dirichlet process prior over each
parameter. Alternatively, we could use a hierarchical Dirichlet process (Teh, Jordan, Beal
& Blei, 2004), in which the distribution sampled from a Dirichlet process is itself a Dirichlet
process. Finally, we may wish to consider an idiosyncratic strategies model, in which it is
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assumed that all subjects draw on a common set of strategies but combine them in an
unique way (e.g., Girolami & Kaba´n, 2004). In short, the inﬁnite groups model is not by
itself an authoritative account of individual diﬀerences. Rather, it is a representative of a
large class of ﬂexible models, each suggesting a fruitful approach for the development of
powerful new cognitive models of individual diﬀerences.
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Appendix: A Gibbs Sampler for Inﬁnite Discrete Groups
Statistical inference in the inﬁnite discrete groups model (Equation 21) can be achieved
using Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for sampling from
the posterior distribution over the variables in a Bayesian model. The Gibbs sampler was
introduced to statistics by Geman and Geman (1984), although it was already well-known
in physics under the name of the “heat-bath algorithm” (Creutz, Jacobs & Rebbi, 1979).
Gilks et al. (1995) and Chen et al. (2000) provide good discussions of MCMC methods,
while Neal (2000) provides a detailed discussion of Gibbs sampling in Dirichlet process
models.
To build a Gibbs sampler for a model with a Dirichlet process prior, we ﬁnd an expression
for the conditional distribution p(gi | g−i,x). This allows us to specify a Gibbs sampler in
which we repeatedly sweep through all of the observations, reassigning the group variable
gi by sampling from this distribution. This results in a sequence of sampled assignment
vectors g that form an Markov chain that converges to samples from p(g |x). In this
approach, we have integrated out the θ variables, so the Gibbs sampler does not provide
samples from the joint posterior p(g, θ |x). However, since the joint distribution can be
factorized into
p(g, θ |x) = p(θ | g,x)p(g |x),
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it is simple enough to generate samples from the joint distribution by also drawing samples
from p(θ | g,x). This distribution is straightforward to specify, ﬁrstly by noting that since
the draws from the base distribution are independent. Therefore,
p(θ | g,x) = ∏
z∈Q∗
p(θz | g,x),
where Q∗ refers to the set of k−i currently non-empty groups. Secondly, we can write
p(θz | g,x) as the posterior distribution,








where we have now reintroduced the dependence on β, the parameter value that describes
our base distribution. Noting that the ﬁrst term is a multinomial probability and the
second term is Dirichlet, we can use conjugacy to infer that
θz | g,x, β ∼ Dirichlet(· |β∗z), (22)
where β∗z = β +
∑
i | gi=z xi.
We now turn to the derivation for the conditional distribution over the group assign-
ments. However, it is important to note that our model employs a mixture of Dirichlet
processes, in which a prior over α is employed. Accordingly, our Gibbs sampler needs to
sweep through the group assignment variables and the dispersion variable. We will begin
by ﬁnding an expression for p(gi = z | g−i, α,x), the posterior probability that the ith
participant is assigned to the group z, given some values for the other group assignment
variables and a value for the dispersion (we will come back to the question of resampling
the dispersion in a moment). Using Bayes’ rule, we can write
p(gi = z | g−i, α,x)∝ p(gi = z | g−i, α)p(xi | gi = z, g−i,x−i)
The ﬁrst term gives the prior probability that a new sample gi from the Dirichlet process
belongs to group z, where z may refer to a member of the set Q∗ of k−i currently non-
empty groups, or it may refer to one of the inﬁnite set Q of currently-empty groups. Using
the conditional distributions described in Equations 10 and 11,
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where s−i,z counts the number of subjects (not including the ith) that are currently
assigned to group z. This is a legitimate approach since samples from the CRP distribution
are exchangeable; so for the purposes of the Gibbs sampling procedure we can always treat
the ith observation as if it were in fact the last (or nth) one.
The second term p(xi | gi = z, g−i,x−i) is the likelihood of the ith participant’s data,
assuming they belong to group z. This can be written,
p(xi | gi = z, g−i,x−i) =
∫

















h=1 Γ(β + q−i,z,h)
∏m
h=1 Γ(β + q·,z,h)
Γ(mβ + q·,z)
where the second line uses Equation 22. In this expression q−i,z,h denotes the number
of times that a participant (not including the ith) currently assigned to group j made
response h, and q−i,z denotes the total number of responses made by these subjects.
The terms q·,z,h and q·,z are deﬁned similarly, except that the ith subject’s data are not
excluded. Taking these results together, the required conditional posterior probability is
given by,




h=1 Γ(β + q−i,z,h)
∏m
h=1 Γ(β + q·,z,h)
Γ(mβ + q·,z)
s−i,z





h=1 Γ(β + q·,z,h)
Γ(mβ + q·,z)
α
n− 1 + α otherwise
(24)
We can use Equation 24 in order to draw Gibbs samples for the group assignment variables.
However, since we are using a Dirichlet process mixture, we also need to resample α.
Throughout this paper, we treat the prior over α as an inverse Gamma(· | a, b) distribution.
Using Antoniak’s (1974) results, the conditional posterior over α depends only on the
number of observed groups k and the sample size n, not the speciﬁc data or the group
assignments. Thus, by expanding the Beta function B(α, n) in Equation 20 we observe
that






Since this conditional distribution is diﬃcult to directly sample from, it is convenient to
employ a “data augmentation”, in which we view p(α | g,x) as the marginalization over
η of the joint distribution,
p(α, η | k, n) ∝ αa+k−1e−bαηα−1(1− η)n−1.
This approach comes from Escobar and West (1995). Using this joint distribution, we can
ﬁnd p(α | η, k, n) and p(η |α, k, n). These distributions are simply,
α | η, k, n ∼ Gamma(· | a + k − 1, b − ln η)
η |α, k, n ∼ Beta(· |α, n).
(25)
Equations 24 and 25 deﬁne the Gibbs sampler. On every iteration of the Gibbs sampler,
we sweep through all the group assignments gi, sampling them from their conditional
distributions, as well as the dispersion α and the dummy variable η. Over time, these
converge to samples from the full posterior distribution p(g, α |x), where convergence can
be measured in a number of ways (see Cowles & Carlin, 1996). Given this distribution, it
is straightforward to make other inferences such as p(k |x).
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